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Abstract. Building on a narrative approach to identify episodes of  fiscal consolidation, 
data for a group of  seventeen industrial countries over the period 1978–2009, and 
continuous-time duration models, we find evidence suggesting that the likelihood of  a 
fiscal consolidation ending increases over time, but only for programmes that last fewer 
than six years. Additionally, fiscal consolidations tend to last longer in non-European than 
in European countries. Our results emphasize that chronic fiscal imbalances might lead to 
a vicious austerity cycle, while discipline in the behaviour of  fiscal authorities is a means 
of  achieving credible and shorter adjustment measures. Therefore, fiscal fatigue is likely to 
compromise the implementation and successfulness of  fiscal consolidation programmes.
Keywords: fiscal consolidation, duration analysis, Weibull model, duration dependence, 
change points
 “The countries in the euro zone shouldn’t add any more austerity programs … . Such 
measures could lead to a downward spiral and need to be delayed until the economy 
recovers.” Peter Bofinger (20 July, 2012)
1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2008–2009 demanded a quick and aggressive response by monetary 
authorities. However, its severity highlighted the need of large fiscal stimulus programmes 
as additional ingredients of the policy mix. Not surprisingly, fiscal authorities in several 
developed countries have actively engaged in expansionary fiscal measures and implemented 
comprehensive expenditure hikes which, together with substantial cyclical revenue losses, 
have led to a sharp widening of budget deficits. The occurrence of the global financial turmoil 
has, thus, became key for investigating the macroeconomic effect of fiscal policy (Agnello 
and Schuknecht, 2011; Agnello and Sousa, 2011; Agnello et al, 2012; Castro, 2010).
More recently, the concerns about long-term (un)sustainability of public finances 
have given support to the view that such a stimulus needs to be withdrawn and budgetary 
consolidation measures should be put in place. However, although there seems to be an 
agreement on the long-term benefits of government debt reductions, there is no unified view 
on the short-term effects of fiscal austerity. In fact, apart from the uncertainty about the 
effect that fiscal retrenchments have on economic performance, some authors have started 
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to argue that business cycle desynchronization is just one of the most visible consequences 
of the extraordinary challenges faced by some countries (Mallick and Mohsin, 2007, 2010; 
Rafiq and Mallick, 2008). In addition, these interventions can negatively impinge on the 
relationship between monetary and financial stability (Castro, 2011a; Castro and Sousa, 
2012; Granville and Mallick, 2009; Sousa, 2010).
In this context, investigating the nature of fiscal consolidations programmes is crucial for 
a timely formulation of policies that can help to fine-tune the trade-off between consolidation 
of public finances and economic growth. How long is the consolidation programme likely 
to last? How similar (or different) are programmes implemented in European countries from 
those put in place elsewhere? Does the end of a fiscal adjustment depend on its own age? Can 
we detect the presence of change points in the duration dependence of fiscal consolidations? 
Can fiscal fatigue undermine the implementation of consolidation programmes?
These are questions that have gained a renewed momentum in recent times, especially 
if one takes into account that there is considerable disagreement about the timing and the 
length of the fiscal adjustments that are necessary to close the gap in public finances brought 
about by the wide range of policies that governments employed in order to deal with the 
most recent financial crisis. In fact, whereas among countries of the euro area the tone has 
been concerned about the need of fiscal austerity in a relatively short period of time as a 
precondition for sustainable growth and a credible path for fiscal stance, other countries such 
as the US and the UK have emphasized that fiscal consolidation may damage growth in the 
short run and become counterproductive, and, thus, have allowed for a longer programmes. In 
this work we aim at providing the answers to the above-mentioned questions and challenges.
We start by building on the narrative approach used for the identification of fiscal 
consolidation (Devries et al, 2011). Therefore, rather than looking at fiscal outcomes, policy 
actions aimed at deficit reduction are evaluated by the analysis of accounts and records of 
what governments were planning to do at the time of publications (such as the IMF Economic 
Developments Reports and Staff Reports, and the OECD Economic Surveys).
Then, we use data for a group of 17 industrialized countries over the period 1978-2009 to 
investigate whether the likelihood of a fiscal consolidation ending depends on its own age, ie, 
whether fiscal consolidation programs are duration dependent. In line with the work of Illera 
and Mulas-Granados (2002), we use continuous-time duration models and find evidence 
of positive duration dependence, which implies that the likelihood of fiscal consolidation 
programmes ending indeed increases over time.
Finally, we assess a dimension that has been typically neglected in this strand of the 
literature: the existence of breaks in the duration dependence. Though the existing works 
assume that the behaviour of duration dependence is smooth (ie, either constant or increasing) 
over time, we conjecture that the degree of likelihood of a fiscal consolidation ending as it gets 
older may change after a certain duration. To proceed with such task, we extend the baseline 
Weibull duration model in order to allow for the presence of a change point in the duration 
dependence parameter.
The results indicate that the positive duration dependence is present in fiscal consolidations 
that last fewer than six years, but no evidence of duration dependence is found for older 
consolidations. This represents a remarkable new finding in this field of research and an 
important contribution to the literature. Indeed, it suggests that countries experiencing fiscal 
adjustments lasting more than six consecutive years are more likely to become trapped in 
a vicious cycle of fiscal consolidation. More specifically, in the presence of chronic fiscal 
imbalances, consolidation measures may become more persistent and, as a result, the time 
for an exit strategy can be surrounded by high uncertainty. This helps to explain why the 
probability of consolidation ending declines at a lower pace for programmes that last more 
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than six years; thereby, suggesting that fiscal fatigue may threaten the successfulness of 
consolidation programmes.
Additionally, our findings show that fiscal consolidations tend to last longer in non-
European than in European countries. The need to comply with the Stability and Growth Pact 
rules and, from an historical point of view, the commitment with respect to the Maastricht 
criteria for entry to the European Monetary Union (EMU) can contribute to describe such 
feature. In addition, the push towards fast corrections of the budget deficits and the fear 
of suffering debt-financing crisis on the financial markets have typically led to the launch of 
discretionary countercyclical fiscal measures. This also helps to justify the occurrence 
of shorter fiscal consolidation programmes in European countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the existing literature 
on the duration of fiscal consolidation. In section 3 we present the econometric model and the 
empirical methodology and in section 4 we describe the data and discuss the results. Finally, 
we conclude the paper in section 5.
2 Literature review
There is a relatively large number of works investigating the effect of fiscal consolidation 
on growth. In fact, the argument about the effectiveness of fiscal policy can be dated back 
to the Keynesian model, and the empirical evidence also seems to support the existence of a 
positive short-term effect of fiscal policy on consumption and output (Blanchard and Perotti, 
2002; Mountford and Uhlig, 2009).
Despite this, other studies suggest the possibility that fiscal policy measures might 
have non-Keynesian effects.(1) Fiscal contractions can be ‘expansionary’ because of the 
improvement in household and business confidence, thereby stimulating the economy even 
in the short term (Feldstein, 1982; Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990). Afonso et al, (2010) highlight 
the importance of distinguishing between the discretionary component of fiscal policy and the 
endogenous response of fiscal deficits to output or the strength of the automatic stabilizers.(2)
From a theoretical point of view, expansionary effects of fiscal adjustments can work 
via both the demand and the supply side. On the demand side a fiscal adjustment may be 
expansionary if it supports the belief that the stabilization is credible and avoids a default on 
government debt (Blanchard, 1990). As a result, a lower premium on government bonds may 
be requested and the associated (positive) wealth effect can boost private spending (Alesina 
and Ardagna, 2010).
Another crucial policy issue is whether cutting spending or raising taxes is more likely to 
stabilize the fiscal stance and generate economic growth. Alesina and Perotti (1995) suggest 
that a fiscal consolidation is successful if the reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio is sufficiently 
large and persistent. Alesina and Ardagna (2010) show that tax cuts are more expansionary 
than spending increases. In contrast, spending cuts are much more effective in terms of debt 
stabilization. Tagkalakis (2011) finds that the successfulness of fiscal consolidation is higher 
when budgetary and economic conditions are worse. Similarly, Afonso and Jalles (2012) 
(1) In this context Castro (2011b) finds that the growth of real GDP per capita in the EU was not
negatively affected by the implementation of fiscal rules and, consequently, the implementation of
the Stability and Growth Pact was not harmful from a growth perspective. Afonso and Sousa (2012)
show that government spending shocks generally have a small effect on GDP and lead to important
crowding-out effects. Afonso and Sousa (2011) find that unexpected variation in fiscal policy can
substantially increase the variability of housing and stock prices.
(2) For an interesting assessment of the relationship between fiscal and political decentralization and
government quality, see Kyriacou and Roca-Sagalés (2011). Nath and Purohit (1995) do not find
evidence supporting a dampening effect of expenditure reassignment and fiscal decentralization on state 
and local governments expenditure. Similarly, Sagbas et al, (2005) show that fiscal decentralization
does not avoid the growth of the size of the public sector.
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stress that the cyclically adjusted primary balance and the duration of the fiscal consolidation 
adjustment contribute to its success, but the same does not hold for revenue-based consolidations.
The literature presented so far has typically focused on the effect of fiscal adjustments 
on aggregate income, on the trade-off between economic growth and income inequality 
(Mulas-Granados, 2005), or on income inequality (Agnello and Sousa, 2014).(3) However, 
the sharp increase in deficits and quick debt build-up that have been recently observed in 
many developed countries are now calling for a return to ‘normal’ times via putting into place 
fiscal austerity measures. This brings a new question into the scene: what is the nature (ie, the 
timing and length) of the fiscal consolidation process?
In this context the duration analysis gains an important relevance. Having flourished in 
the engineering and medical fields, its use rapidly spread out to other sciences. In economics 
it started to be employed in labour economics to assess the duration of unemployment spells 
and business cycles or (Castro, 2010, 2013; Sichel, 1991; Zuehlke, 2003). The Weibull model 
with proposed change points was also adapted by Castro (2013) to show that positive duration 
dependence in expansions is no longer present when these are longer than ten years.
Because of its properties, this kind of analysis is also suitable for studying the duration 
of fiscal consolidation programmes. For instance, using nonparametric and parametric 
continuous-time duration models and focusing on a set of political variables, Illera and 
Mulas-Granados (2002) find evidence of positive duration dependence in fiscal consolidation 
programmes in the European Union. Similarly, Agnello et al, (2013) show that fiscal variables 
(such as the budget deficit and the level of public debt) and economic factors (such as the 
degree of openness, the inflation rate, the interest rate, and per capita GDP) are crucial for 
the fiscal consolidation process. However, while the previous studies assume that the duration 
dependence parameter remains unchanged over the entire duration of the event, we challenge 
this perspective by investigating whether the degree of likelihood of a consolidation ending 
displays a change point.
3 Econometric Approach
3.1 Duration Analysis
We start by assuming that the duration variable is defined as the number of periods over 
which a fiscal consolidation programme is being implemented. If T measures the time span 
between the beginning of the programme and its end, then t1, t2, … , tn will represent the 
observed duration of the fiscal consolidation. The probability distribution of the duration 
variable, T, can be specified by the cumulative distribution function, F(t) = Pr(T < t), and 
the corresponding density function is f(t) = dF(t)/dt. Alternatively, the distribution of T can 
be characterized by the survivor function, S(t) = Pr(T H t) = 1−F(t), which measures the 
probability that the duration of a fiscal consolidation programme is larger or equal to t.
A particularly useful function for duration analysis is the hazard function, ( ) ( ) ( ) ,h f St t t=  
which measures the rate at which fiscal consolidation spells will end at time t, given that 
they lasted until that moment. In other words, it measures the probability of exiting from 
a state in moment t conditional on the length of time in that state. This function helps to 
characterize the path of duration dependence. For instance: (a) if dh(t)/dt > 0 for t = t*, there is 
positive duration dependence in t*; (b) if dh(t)/dt < 0 for t = t*, then there is negative duration 
dependence in t*; and (c) if dh(t)/dt = 0 for t = t*, there is no duration dependence. Therefore, 
when the derivative of the hazard function with respect to time is positive, the probability of 
a fiscal consolidation ending in moment t, given that it has reached t*, increases with its age. 
Thus, the longer the fiscal consolidation programme is, the higher the conditional probability 
of its end will be.
(3) Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez (2011) show that fiscal decentralization policies increase poverty,
but reduce income inequality.
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From the hazard function, we can derive the integrated hazard function,
and compute the survivor function, ( ) [ ( )]expS Ht t= . Though different parametric continuous-
time duration models can measure the magnitude of duration dependence and the impact of 
other time-invariant variables on the likelihood of an event ending, the most commonly used 
functional form of the hazard function is the proportional hazard model:
( ) ( )expt xh( , ) ht x 0 b= (1)
where ( )h t0  is the baseline hazard function that captures the data dependence of duration 
and represents an unknown parameter to be estimated; b is a (k × 1) vector of parameters 
that need to be estimated; and x is a vector of covariates. The proportional hazard model can 
be estimated without imposing any specific functional form to the baseline hazard function 
(the so-called ‘Cox model’). Given the inappropriateness of this procedure (in particular for 
studying duration dependence), a popular alternative imposes a specific parametric form 
for the function ( )h t0 ; that is, the ‘Weibull model’.
3.2 The basic Weibull model
The Weibull model is characterized by the following (baseline) hazard function:
( )h t pt p0 1c= -  , (2)
where p parameterizes the duration dependence, t denotes time, γ is a constant; moreover, 
p > 0 and γ > 0. If p > 1, the conditional probability of a turning point occurring increases as 
the phase gets older—that is, there is positive duration dependence; if p < 1 there is negative 
duration dependence; and finally, there is no duration dependence if p = 1. Therefore, by 
estimating p, we can test for duration dependence in fiscal consolidation programmes.
Inserting the Weibull specification for the baseline hazard function, as expressed by 
equation (2), in the proportional hazard function denoted by equation (1), we get:
( , ) ( )exph t x pt xp 1c b= -  . (3)
Hence, the corresponding survivor function can be written as:
( , ) [ ( )]exp expS t tx xpc b= -  . (4)
This model can be estimated by maximum likelihood, and the log-likelihood function, for 
a sample of i = 1, …, n fiscal consolidations, is given by:
( ) [ ( ) ( , )]
[ ( ) ] ( ) ,
ln ln ln
ln ln ln exp
h SL c t t
c p p t t
x x
x x1
i i i
i
n
i i i
p
i
i
n
1
1
$
c cb b
= +
= + + - + -
=
=
6 @
/
/ (5)
where ci indicates when observations are censored. If the sample period under analysis ends 
before the turning point has been observed, then observations will be censored (ie, ci = 0); 
when the turning points are observed in the sample period, the observations are not censored 
(in which case, ci = 1).
3.3 A Weibull model with change points
Though the basic structure of the log-likelihood function for the Weibull model allows us to 
analyze the presence of duration dependence in fiscal consolidations, we also move a step 
further in that we assess the extent to which the likelihood of a fiscal consolidation ending as 
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it gets older changes after a certain duration. Thus, we allow for the possibility of a structural 
break in the Weibull model and conjecture that the parameters of the baseline hazard function 
(p and γ) can change at a certain point (ie, the ‘change point’) in time. In particular, we expect 
that the degree of duration dependence, p, changes after the event has lasted more than a 
certain time. Consequently, we do not expect only that the likelihood of a consolidation 
programme ending increases over time, but also that if it has lasted more than a certain time, 
the likelihood of ending may change significantly after that point.
We propose a Weibull model for fiscal consolidation with change points that follows 
the general model framework developed by Castro (2013) for cases where the Weibull 
distribution, or the respective parameters characterizing the baseline hazard function, vary 
over time for different intervals, but remain constant within each interval.(4) For simplicity, 
let us rewrite equation (2) as:
( ) ( )h t pt p tp p0 1 1c m m= =- -  , (6)
where γ = λp. Hence, the survival function becomes:
 . (7)
Denoting ( ) ( )lng Ht t=  and considering a change point, τc, and two intervals, 
, ( )and gt t t t tc c T0 1 1G Gx x  can be expressed as:
( ) ( )lng t tj p jm=  , (8)
with j = 1 or j = 2. Because the continuity of g(t) in the change point, τc, has to be verified, 
we must impose that:
( ) ( )ln lnc cp p1 21 2m x m x=  . (9)
Solving this equation with respect to p2, we get:
( )
( )
ln
ln
p p
c
c
2 1
2
1
m x
m x
=  . (10)
Consequently, in the case of the survival time ending in the first interval, we have:
( ) ( )lng t p tj 1 1 1m==  , (11)
and, similarly, for the survival time ending in the second interval:
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )ln ln
ln
lng t p t p t
c
c
j 2 2 2 1
2
1
2m m x
m x
m= ==  . (12)
Considering the i th spell (or individual), we get:
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )ln ln
ln
lng t d p t d p t1 1
c
c
i1 1 1 1
2
1
2 1m m x
m x
m= + -  , (13)
where di = 1 if j = 1 or, more precisely, , ift t d j0 2c i0 1 G x = = —that is, ,t tc T1 Gx —
and i = 1, 2, …, n; that is, the number of spells.
Since ( , ) [ ( ) ]expH gt tx xi i i ib= + , the hazard function is, therefore, given by:
( , ) ( , )/ ( ) ( , )
( )
( )
( )
( , ) .ln
ln
h dH d g Ht t t t t
d t
p
d t
p
t
x x x
x1 H
c
c
i i i i i i i i
i
i
i
i
i
i i
1
2
1
m x
m x
= =
= + -
l
 . (14)
(4) For this reason, we are not able to include (time-varying) economic, political, and institutional 
factors as potential determinants of the duration of fiscal consolidation.
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Attending to the relation between the survivor function and the integrated hazard, 
( , ) [ ( , )]expt tx xS Hi i i i= - , the log-likelihood function can be written as:
( ) [ ( ) ( ) ] [ ( ) ]ln ln expg g gL c t t tx xi i i i i
i
n
1
$ b b= + + - +
=
l" ,/  , (15)
where 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
ln
ln
g t d t
p
d t
p
t
t
1
c
c
i i
i1
1 1
2
1
m
m
= + -l  .
This model is estimated by maximum likelihood, given a particular change point τc. The 
relevance of the change point is evaluated by testing whether there is a statistically significant 
difference between p1 and p2, that is, whether the duration dependence parameter changes 
significantly between the two subperiods.
4 Data and empirical results
4.1 Data
We use annual data for seventeen industrialized countries over the period 1978–2009.(5) 
Because of the potential correlation between the measurement error of the cyclically 
adjusted primary budget balance (CAPB) and the economic developments, and the omission 
of periods during which fiscal consolidation is followed by negative economic news and 
counterbalancing discretionary stimulus, we rely on the work of Devries et al (2011) and use a 
narrative approach to identify fiscal consolidation episodes, instead of the standard statistical 
approach.(6)
Therefore, various accounts and records of what policy makers believed at the time that 
decisions were taken, as well of the budgetary impact of such measures recorded in the year 
in which they come into effect with the sole goal of reducing the budget deficit to achieve 
long-term sustainability, are examined. Similarly, only measures that are announced and 
implemented are considered, temporary and permanent measures are distinguished, and the 
size and the composition of the fiscal consolidation programme are also quantified. All in 
all, the narrative approach allows us to eliminate the endogenous response of fiscal policy to 
short-term output developments.
By organizing the data in spells—where a spell represents the number of years that a fiscal 
consolidation lasts and is denoted by DurCons—we are able to identify thirty-nine consolidation 
spells. While testing for the presence of duration dependence in fiscal consolidation and 
change points in its behaviour, we also allow for differences between European and non-
European countries. That is, we test whether there is a significant difference in the average 
duration of fiscal consolidation, as well as in the duration dependence parameter, p, between 
these two groups of countries. This is done by including the dummy D_EC in the model, which 
takes the value of one for European countries and 0 otherwise. Additionally, we estimate 
separate regressions for each of the groups.
We also take into account the effects of some regressors that are assumed to be time-
invariant. For the analysis of the business cycle, Zellner (1990) and Sichel (1991) suggest that 
the duration of the previous business cycle phases may affect the length of the current phase. 
(5) The choice of the countries is dictated by data availability, and our samples includes: Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
(6) Additionally, the statistical approach includes some degree of arbitrariness due to the assumptions 
made about the ‘amplitude’ and the ‘duration’ of the adjustment in the CAPB. Indeed, changing such 
thresholds implies a different number of austerity episodes, thereby leading to an inaccurate measure 
of discretionary fiscal policy.
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Therefore, we test whether that might also be the case for fiscal consolidation, by including 
the variable DurPrev in the estimations.
In addition, we analyze whether the duration of fiscal consolidation becomes gradually 
longer or shorter over time, by considering a kind of a trend variable, labelled as Event, which 
reports the order or observation number of each event over time and for every single country. 
This variable is equals to 1 for the first event, 2 for the second, and so on. If the coefficient 
on this variable is significantly smaller (larger) than zero, phase durations get longer (shorter) 
over time.
In table 1 we report some descriptive statistics for the duration of fiscal consolidation 
programmes. The table shows the number of spells of fiscal consolidations (Obs), for 
all countries (All), for European countries (EC) and non-European countries (NEC). 
Interestingly, fiscal consolidations seem to last longer for non-European countries than for 
European countries. Whether this difference is statistically significant or not is an issue that 
we will try to answer with the estimation of the continuous-time Weibull model.
4.2 The baseline model
The empirical evidence that emerges from the estimation of the Weibull model presented 
in subsection 3.2. is summarized in table 2. We recall that the estimate of p measures the 
magnitude of the duration dependence and γ corresponds to the estimate of the constant term.
A one-sided test is used to detect the presence of positive duration dependence (ie, 
whether p >1) and the sign + indicates significance at a 5% level. The results provide strong 
evidence of positive duration dependence for fiscal consolidations, that is, the likelihood 
of a fiscal consolidation ending increases as the programme becomes older. Moreover, p 
is statistically lower than or equal to 2, that is, the statistical analysis of the second-order 
derivative of the baseline hazard function indicates the presence of decreasing or constant 
positive duration dependence. Putting it differently, the probability of a fiscal consolidation 
ending at time t, given that it lasted until that period, increases over time, but at a decreasing 
or constant rate.
In column 1 we assume that the population of individual spells is homogeneous: that 
is, each fiscal consolidation is under the same risk of ending. Given that this may not be a 
good description, column 2 allows for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity or frailty. 
In statistical terms a frailty model is similar to a random-effects model for duration analysis: 
it represents an unobserved random proportionality factor that modifies the hazard function 
of an individual spell and accounts for heterogeneity caused by unmeasured covariates or 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
Variable Observations Mean SD Min Max
DurCons
All 39 4.74 3.31 1 14
EC 31 4.23 2.75 1 10
NEC 8 6.75 4.62 2 14
D_EC 39 0.79 0.41 0 1
Event 39 1.77 0.81 1 4
DurPrev 22 4.05 2.59 1 10
Notes. Fiscal consolidation programmes are identified using the work of Devries et al (2011). The 
table reports the number of episodes (observations), the mean duration (mean), the standard deviation 
(SD), the minimum (min) and the maximum (max) duration for each spell. The data are annual and 
comprise seventeen industrialized countries over the period 1978–2009.
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measurement errors. In order to include frailty in the Weibull model, the hazard function 
expressed by equation (3) is modified as follows:
( , | ) ( , )h ht v v tx x=  , (16)
where v is an unobserved individual-spell effect that scales the no-frailty component. 
The random variable v is assumed to be positive with unity mean, finite variance (θ), and 
independently distributed from t and x. The survival function becomes:
( , | ) [ ( , )]S St v tx x v=  . (17)
Because the values of v are not observed, we cannot estimate them. Therefore, we follow 
Lancaster (1990) and assume v follows a gamma distribution with unity mean and variance 
θ. Consequently, the frailty survival function can be written as:
( , | , ) [ ( , )]lnSt tx x1S ( / )1i ib = - i-  ; (18)
the frailty hazard function becomes:
( , | , ) ( , ) [ ( , | , )]x h St t tx xh i ib b= i ; (19)
Table 2. Duration dependence–basic Weibull model estimation.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
γ 0.0821*** 0.0793*** 0.0062 0.0394** 0.0291 0.0044 0.0724*** 0.0864*** 0.0324*
[0.0258] [0.0252] [0.0042] [0.0181] [0.0183] [0.0053] [0.0247] [0.0321] [0.0187]
p 1.5038+, d 1.5453+,d 2.1614+,c 1.6029+,d 1.6144+,d 1.7478+,c 1.3757+,d 1.5793+,d 1.3884+,d
[0.1425] [0.1733] [0.2632] [0.1178] [0.1177] [0.2394] [0.1788] [0.1440] [0.1306]
Δp 0.2859**
[0.1400]
θ 0.0467
[0.1523]
D_EC 0.7421** 0.7200** 0.6811
[0.3783] [0.3700] [0.5272]
Event 0.1720 0.2079
[0.2565] [0.3085]
DurPrev 0.0262
[0.640]
Log- 
likelihood
−45.06 −45.05 −34.15 −43.2 −42.94 −23.07 −93.78 −35.15 −8.03
LR test 0.759 0.149
SBIC 97.46 101.1 71.97 97.39 100.54 61.60 198.56 77.16 20.22
Spells 39 39 39 39 39 22 39 31 8
*** statistically significat at 1%; ** statistically sign ificant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%.
Notes. Heteroscedasticity and serial autocorrelation robust standard errors clustered by country are 
reported in square brackets; ⁺ indicates that p is significantly higher than 1 using a one-sided test 
with a 5% significance level; d, and c, indicate decreasing and constant positive duration dependence, 
respectively; △p is the estimated difference in the duration dependence parameter between European 
and Non-European countries. In Column 2, the p-value of the likelihood ratio (LR) test for unobserved 
heterogeneity/frailty gives assesses if the estimated variance (ϴ) is different from zero. In Column 3, 
the p-value of the LR test analyses the statistical significance of country-specific dummy variables 
(pooling test), that is, LR=-2(logLr-logLu), where r and u correspond to the restricted and unrestricted 
models, respectively. The Schwartz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC) is computed as follows: 
SBIC=2(-logL+(k/2)logN), where k is the number of regressors and N is the number of observations 
(spells).
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and the corresponding log-likelihood function can be expressed as:
( ) [ ( ) ] [ ( )]ln ln ln ln ln expL c p p t c tx x1 1 1i i i ip i
i
n
1
1
$ c i cb b
= + + - + - + +
=
l la k% // . (20)
The variance parameter (θ), which measures the presence (or absence) of unobserved 
heterogeneity, is an additional parameter that needs to be estimated. As θ is always greater 
than zero, the limiting distribution of the maximum-likelihood estimate of θ is a normal 
distribution that is halved or chopped off at the zero bound. Therefore, the likelihood ratio 
(LR) test used to detect its presence is a ‘boundary’ test that takes in account the fact that the 
null distribution is not the usual |2 with one degree of freedom, but rather a mixture of a |2 
with no degrees of freedom and a |2 with one degree of freedom The results do not show 
evidence of unobserved heterogeneity, as corroborated by the p-value of the LR test reported 
at the bottom of column 2.
Even though the presence of frailty (or ‘random effects’) has not been detected, individual-
country effects may still be present, given that the sample consists of seventeen countries that 
may have individual-specific characteristics. Therefore, in column 3 we add country dummy 
variables to the set of regressors. In this case we test for pooling—that is, the LR test is used 
to assess whether the model controlling for country-specific effects is preferred to simple 
pooling. Once again, the p-value of the LR test reported at the bottom of Column 3 does not 
support the existence of country-specific effects.
In column 4 we add the dummy variable D_EC to the set of regressors in order to analyze if 
the mean duration of fiscal consolidation is statistically different between European and non-
European countries. As can be seen, the coefficient associated with D_EC is highly significant 
and its sign is positive in magnitude, which suggests that fiscal consolidation programmes 
last longer in Non-European countries. This finding can be related to the traditionally more 
disciplined fiscal stance of European countries, as a result of the adoption and implementation 
over time of a set of rules constraining the behaviour of fiscal authorities. For instance, this 
was the case of the Maastricht criteria for entry in the EMU and the Stability and Growth 
Pact rules.
In column 5 we control for the possibility that duration of fiscal consolidation is affected 
over time and, as a result, we include the trend variable (Event) in the model. Although the 
difference in duration between European and non-European countries remains significant, 
the findings do not uncover a change in the duration of fiscal consolidations over time.
Additionally, in column 6 we analyze whether the duration of the previous phase (DurPrev) 
affects the length of the current phase, but no evidence was found in that direction. This 
experiment implies a substantial reduction in the number of spells, which helps explaining 
the lack of statistical significance of the coefficient associated with D_EC.
The results presented so far show that the average duration of fiscal consolidation in 
European countries is significantly different from the one implemented in Non-European 
countries. However, one question remains: is this explained by the difference in the magnitude 
of the duration dependence parameter?
 To answer the question, in column 7 we replace the parameter p by DECp pD+ , and 
directly estimate that difference (ie, Δp). The empirical findings confirm that the duration 
dependence parameter is higher for European countries. As the estimated coefficient, Δp, is 
positive and statistically significant, the likelihood of a fiscal consolidation ending increases 
at a higher rate for these set of countries. Additionally, the estimated duration dependence 
parameter for the European countries is 1.6616 (= 1.3757 + 0.2859) with a standard error 
equal to 0.1332, which means that evidence of decreasing positive duration dependence also 
characterizes consolidation processes.
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Finally, in columns 8 and 9 we estimate separate regressions for European countries 
and non-European countries, respectively. The results confirm that the duration dependence 
parameter is larger for European countries (1.5793) than for Non-European countries (1.3884).
4.3 The model with change-points in duration dependence
The results presented in table 2 rely on the assumption that the magnitude of duration 
dependence is time-invariant. In figure 1, we plot the survivor functions for all countries 
and for European versus Non-European countries. It can be seen that the probability (or 
proportion) of a fiscal consolidation surviving after duration ti substantially decreases as the 
programme becomes older. The sharp decline is consistent with the existence of positive 
duration dependence. Moreover, for all countries and Non-European countries, the survivor 
functions quick fall until ti = 6 and then evolve at a slower pace. This highlights the possibility 
of a break in duration dependence and the need of a more flexible framework allowing for a 
change point in the Weibull distribution at τc = 6. In fact, figure 1 suggests that the magnitude 
of duration dependence might be lower when fiscal consolidations are longer than six years 
and the likelihood of a fiscal consolidation ending can significantly change above that period.
Another signal of the existence of a break point in duration dependence is provided by 
the slope of the survivor functions. In the case of the full sample, the average slope is equal 
to −0.123 for fiscal consolidations that are shorter than six years and −0.026 for programmes 
that last longer than six years. Putting it differently, when fiscal consolidations have a duration 
shorter than six years, each additional year of the program increases the likelihood of its 
ending by 12.3 percentage points, on average. In contrast, when fiscal consolidations have 
a length longer than six years, each additional year of the programme rises the likelihood of 
its ending by 2.6 percentage points. Similar results can be found for the sample of European 
and Non-European countries: (a) in the case of European countries the difference remains 
Figure 1. Survivor functions. (a) All countries, (b) European countries, (c) non-European countries.
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substantial, but it is smaller given that the average slope of the survivor function decreases 
from only −0.116 (in the case of fiscal consolidations that last fewer than six years) to −0.048 
(for programmes that have a duration longer than six years); (b) in the case of non-European 
countries the difference is considerably larger, concerning that the average slope of the 
survivor function is −0.156 and −0.031 for fiscal consolidations that are shorter and longer 
than six years, respectively.
In order to test for the presence of differences in the duration dependence parameter, 
we consider a Weibull model with a change point. Therefore, we estimate two dependence 
duration parameters, one for the first period (p1) and another one for the second period (p2), 
and evaluate the statistical significance of the difference between the two (p2−p1).
The results are reported in table 3. In column 1 we estimate a simple equation without 
covariates. In column 2 we control for differences in the average duration of fiscal 
consolidations between European and non-European countries. In columns 3 and 4 we 
account for the possibility that the duration of fiscal consolidation changes over time and 
depends on the duration of the previous spell.
Through we confirm that the duration of fiscal consolidation is typically longer for non-
European countries and there are no significant effects of the duration of previous spells on 
the duration of a given fiscal consolidation programme, the most interesting and remarkable 
Table 3. Duration dependence; Weibull model estimation with change points.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
γ1 0.1998*** 0.2279*** 0.2168*** 0.1965* 0.2079*** 0.1762***
[0.0183] [0.0569] [0.0772] [0.1029] [0.0242] [0.0267]
γ2 0.2158*** 0.2428*** 0.2281** 0.2019 0.2010*** 0.2095
[0.0319] [0.0910] [0.1089] [0.1327] [0.0243] [0.1532]
p1 1.6894+,c 1.6884+,c 1.6966+,c 1.8145+,c 1.5217+,d 3.4083+,i
[0.2205] [0.2130] [0.2076] [0.2945] [0.1758] [0.7377]
p2 1.1876 1.4036 1.4214 1.5578 1.7960+,c 0.8253
[0.2143] [0.2607] [0.2661] [0.4040] [0.3363] [0.3374]
p2−p1 −0.5018** −0.2847* −0.2752 −0.2567 0.2743 −2.5830***
[0.2290] [0.1667] [0.1696] [0.1717] [0.2114] [0.8946]
D_EC 0.6681* 0.6501* 0.6144
[0.4014] [0.3931] [0.5269]
Event 0.1675 0.1787
[0.2581] [0.3303]
DurPrev 0.0234
[0.0661]
Log-
likelihood
−94.66 −93.27 −93.02 −51.27 −71.53 −19.62
SBIC 200.31 201.2 204.37 124.19 153.37 43.41
Spells 39 39 39 22 31 8
*** statistically significat at 1%; ** statistically sign ificant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%.
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in square brackets. p2−p₁ is the estimated difference in the 
duration dependence parameters. The change point is located at duration equal to six years. ⁺ indicates 
that p is significantly higher than 1 using a one-sided test with a 5% significance level; d, c, and i 
indicate decreasing, constant and increasing positive duration dependence, respectively.
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results are the ones related to the duration dependence parameter. In fact, they strongly 
suggest that the duration dependence parameter is time-varying. In particular, despite the 
existence of positive duration dependence, the magnitude of the parameter is significantly 
lower when fiscal consolidation programmes are longer than six years: the coefficient 
associated with p2−p1 is negative and statistically significant. Positive duration dependence is 
still present in consolidations that last fewer than six years but, when their length is longer, 
duration dependence is not statistically significant; that is, the likelihood of ending is no 
longer dependent on their age. Indeed, while the parameter p1 is statistically significant in all 
model specification, p2 does not seem to exhibit statistical significance.
These results suggest that, when countries display chronic fiscal imbalances, the need 
of consolidation measures becomes a frequent characteristic. Putting it differently, countries 
will be eventually trapped in a vicious cycle of austerity and, as a consequence, the likelihood 
of a fiscal consolidation ending declines at a lower pace for programmes that are longer than 
six years. As a result, the evidence corroborates the idea that fiscal fatigue can be a threat to 
the implementation (and, consequently, the successfulness) of fiscal consolidation.
Finally, we consider separately the two subgroups of countries (ie, European and non-
European countries) in columns 5 and 6. The empirical findings show that the presence of 
a change point is significant for non-European countries, but not for European countries. 
Even though the estimated difference in the duration dependence parameter (p2−p1) is not 
statistically significant in this group of countries, the evidence still corroborates the existence 
of positive duration dependence for both consolidations that are shorter or longer than six 
years: the parameters p1 and p2 are positive (1.5217 and 1.7960, respectively) and statistically 
significant. For Non-European countries, the duration dependence parameter is larger in 
magnitude for consolidations that last fewer than six years (3.4083), and the results suggest 
that it is increasing. However, no evidence of duration dependence is found for longer fiscal 
consolidation programmes.
5 Conclusion
While some continuous-time and discrete-time duration models have successfully detected 
positive duration dependence in fiscal consolidations (Illera and Mulas-Granados, 2002), the 
existing works do not consider the possibility of breaks (or ‘change points’) in the duration 
dependence.
In this paper we argue that the likelihood of a fiscal consolidation ending changes as 
the programme becomes older. More specifically, we build on a novel database of fiscal 
consolidation episodes constructed by Devries et al (2011), and extend the basic Weibull 
duration model allowing for the presence of a change point in the duration dependence 
parameter. Using data for seventeen industrialized countries over the period 1978–2009, we 
confirm the presence of positive duration dependence in fiscal consolidations.
Interestingly, we uncover a change point in duration dependence. In particular, the 
magnitude of the duration dependence parameter decreases significantly when a fiscal 
consolidation programme is longer than six years. This implies that fiscal fatigue can undermine 
the efforts associated with fiscal adjustments and severely damage the successfulness of 
consolidation programmes. Additionally, while positive duration dependence is found for 
those consolidations that last fewer than six years, when duration is longer than this threshold, 
fiscal consolidations are not duration dependent. This is a remarkable new finding, as it 
shows that the likelihood of a fiscal consolidation ending increases at a constant rate with its 
age. However, when it is running for more than six years, the likelihood of its end no longer 
depends on the actual duration or age.
From a policy perspective, this result highlights that chronic fiscal imbalances can lead 
to a vicious austerity cycle, where consolidation measures may need to be implemented 
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over longer time spans. This comes at the cost of high uncertainty about the timing of the 
consolidation ending and the additional contractionary packages that may be required to 
achieve a sound and sustainable fiscal stance.
Given the nature of the countries covered in this study, we also compare the characteristics 
of the duration of fiscal consolidation programmes between European and non-European 
countries. We find that fiscal consolidations tend to last longer in non-European countries 
than in European countries. The results also show the presence of a change point in the 
duration dependence parameter for non-European countries, but not for European countries. 
In addition, while positive duration dependence is always present in European countries, for 
non-European countries this happens only in fiscal consolidations that last fewer than six 
years.
This set of findings for European countries give rise to the role played by the commitment 
towards the Maastricht criteria for entry in the EMU and the compliance with the Stability 
and Growth Pact rules. It is also in line with the political support for a quick correction of 
budget deficits and the fear of crisis with roots on the unsustainable path of public debt.
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